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Abstract 
 
This study attempts to identify the determinant factors of credit rating in Brazil. The relevance of this proposal is 
based on the importance of the subject as well as the uniqueness of the Brazilian market. As for originality, the 
great majority of previous studies regarding credit rating have been developed in the US, UK and Australia; 
therefore the effect on other markets is still unclear, especially in emerging markets, like Brazil. We’ve used a 
Generalized  Estimating  Equations  (GEE)  model  considering  a  panel  structure  with  a  categorical  dependent 
variable (credit rating) and ten independent variables: leverage, profitability, size, financial coverage, growth, 
liquidity,  corporate  governance,  control,  financial  market  performance  and  internationalization.  The  sample 
consisted of 153 rating observations during the period of 1997-2011 for a total of 49 public firms operating in the 
Brazilian  Market.  Results  showed  that  leverage  and  internationalization  are  significant  at  the  1%  level  in 
explaining credit rating. Performance in the financial market was significant at a 5% level; profitability and 
growth were also statistically significant, but at a 10% significance level. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Credit  rating  agencies  play  an  important  role  in  modern  financial  markets  since  they  are 
institutions  with  privileged  access  to  private  information  about  security  issuers  thanks  to  their 
screening processes (Calderoni, Colla, & Gatti, 2009). According to Kang and Liu (2007), credit 
ratings have been broadly embraced by financial markets because the levels and changes in ratings are 
likely  to  predict  the likelihood  of  defaults.  Regarding  this  aspect,  prior studies  have  showed  that 
default risk has a significant association with the ratings assigned by agencies. 
In  the  market  view,  rating  agencies  are  expected  to  be  independent  third  parties  in  the 
borrower/lender relationship, which evaluates the financial condition of the debt issuer. In fact, as 
López (2007) states, new laws and regulations recommend the use of external ratings by supervisory 
authorities as relevant information to control the financial solvency of the entities themselves. 
Papaikonomou (2010) certifies that, undoubtedly, credit rating agencies can provide a valuable 
service for capital markets if they deliver a credible and independent assessment of the relative default 
probability of financial credit instruments that enables investors to reduce the information asymmetry 
they  face  vis-à-vis  borrowers.  Investors  should  be  able  to  make  better  decisions  as  they  can 
differentiate  good  quality  security  from  lemons.  In  this  sense,  one  expects  rating  agencies  to 
contribute to a more efficient resource allocation in the economy.   
Due to the evolution of financial markets and the correspondent increase in regulation, rating 
agencies are becoming more important on a global scale. In spite of the drop in the cost of acquiring 
information, owing to technological progress, the role of global credit rating agencies is thus becoming 
even more fundamental for the working of world financial markets (Ferri & Liu, 2002).  
According  to  Poon  and  Chan  (2008)  one  strand  of  credit  rating  research  focuses  on  the 
determinants. This literature focuses on the predictability of credit rating changes based on companies’ 
financial information and capital market conditions. It primarily uses deterministic models such as 
discriminant and cluster analyses to investigate the underlying determinants of credit ratings. This 
deterministic model approach assumes that the financial analysts of credit rating agencies use all of the 
accounting information of the issuer as well as capital market conditions in determining the credit 
rating of a particular company.  
Gray, Mirkovic and Ragunathan (2006) state that there is a substantial literature that seeks to 
quantify the relationship between financial and industry data, and credit ratings that has progressed 
with the development of econometric techniques for analyzing categorical dependent variables. 
This line of research that uses financial ratios and firm characteristics to explain the ratings has 
appeared primarily in the accounting and finance literature (Bouzouita & Young, 1998).  In these 
papers, credit rating is a proxy for credit risk and consequently tends to be influenced by variables 
related to a company’s financial position, as well as qualitative variables that are taken into account by 
rating agencies. Among these studies, it is worthwhile to mention the seminal paper of Altman (1968, 
p.  594),  entitled  “Financial  Ratios,  Discriminant  Analysis  and  the  Prediction  of  Corporate 
Bankruptcy”,  that  used  a  model  with  accounting  ratios  to  discriminate  solvents  and  insolvent 
companies.  
Along this line of thinking, the aim of this study is to identify the determinants of credit rating 
in Brazil. As for relevance, Kim and Gu (2004, p. 96) ensure that “a model capable of predicting bond 
rating would enable firms to identify factors affecting their bond ratings and take actions to reduce the 
perceived risk and lower the cost of borrowing”. Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) believe that a measure of a 
firm’s credit risk is an important dependent variable for study and that bond ratings do capture a 
significant aspect of credit risk. The Determinants of Credit Rating   191 
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For Adams, Burton and Harwick (2003), insights into the determinants of credit ratings could 
assist industry regulators, policyholders, and investors when deciding whether or not to rely on the 
ratings  assigned  by  credit  rating  firms.  It  is  argued  that  investors  could  adjust  their  investment 
portfolio based on the results presented by credit rating models.   
This study is also relevant due to the incipience of credit rating studies in the Brazilian Market. 
According to Creighton, Gower and Anthony (2007) most previous studies have used data from the 
United States, where there is a more significant role for credit ratings. While there is no previous work 
on this topic relating to emerging markets, “there is substantial literature in mature markets (mainly 
the United States) on the relationship between rating changes and their effects on bond and stock 
prices” (Richards & Deddouche, 2003, p. 339). 
According to Han, Shin, Reinhart, and Moore (2009), credit ratings, especially those issued by 
Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s are critical to international investors who wish to invest in corporate 
debt from emerging  markets because: (a) financial information in emerging markets  is much less 
transparent than in developed markets, (b) there are no reliable financial institutions in emerging 
markets  that  can  certify  the  eligibility  of  a  debt  to  international  investors;  (c)  many  foreign 
institutional investors are not allowed to invest in speculative grade bonds in emerging markets, and 
(d) bank regulators use ratings for financial regulation and supervision and capital adequacy rules. 
Furthermore, the Brazilian market has some specific characteristics that can lead to different 
results than those founded in other markets. Note, for example, that Brazil has adopted a Code Law 
legal system, mainly derived from Portugal. According to prior research regarding law and finance 
(La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Schleifer, & Vishny, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002), code law countries have: 
(a) less developed equity markets; (b) firms with more concentrated control; (c) a lower number of 
publicly traded companies and smaller number of initial public offering each year; (d) more companies 
penalized by investors in the valuation process; and (e) companies that pay lower dividends.  
According  to  Lopes  and  Walker  (2012),  the  Brazilian  Market  is  characterized  by  low 
enforcement, incentives for manipulation of financial statements due to tax influences, an unstable 
financial market and poor governance standards. In this sense, it is not clear if credit rating has a 
significant role in the Brazilian Market. Moreover, note also the economic importance that Brazil has 
been gaining in the global economy, due to high economic growth rates presented in recent years, 
inflation being under control and the stability of its financial institutions. In 2012, Brazil became the 
7
th largest economy. In short, the Brazilian market presents a unique setting for conducting studies on 
credit rating.  
 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
The word  risk has its origins in the sixteenth-century Europe, during the Renaissance, and 
derives from the Italian word risicare, which in turn has its origin in the Latin risicu, riscu, which 
means to dare. In this sense, risk is a choice, not a fate (Bernstein, 1997).  
According to Guerron-Quintana (2011, p. 10), in the field of Economics, risk was seminally 
discussed  by  Frank  Knight  in  1921,  in  his  book  entitled  “Risk,  Uncertainty,  and  Profit”.  Knight 
outlined the difference between risk  - unknown outcomes whose probability of happening can be 
measured, or at least have a good knowledge - and uncertainty - uncertain events that people do not 
know how to describe. 
Specifically  in  the  financial  market,  the  word  risk  is  often  related  to  the  possibility  of  an 
investment  loss.  In  the  seminal  work  of  Markowitz  (1952),  for  example,  risk  was  related  to 
uncertainty, represented by the variability of the expected return of a given asset.  F. C. de S. Murcia, F. D. Murcia, S. Rover, J. A. Borba  192 
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Credit risk, in turn, is associated with the fulfillment of the obligations to the lender. According 
to Sales (2006), the concept of credit risk can be understood as the probability of an issuer to default, 
leading to non-payment of interest and/or principal. 
In  financial  markets,  investors  are  often  interested  in  measuring  the  risk  of  a  company  or 
country  to  decide  about  possible  investments  (Sih,  2006).  According  to  Callado,  Vasconcelos, 
Rodrigues and Libonati (2008) since the 1980’s, the demand for information related to credit risk 
analysis  has  increased  dramatically  in  the  international  financial  market,  and  from  that  demand, 
several methodologies have been developed.  
Credit ratings express the agency’s opinion about the ability and willingness of an issuer to meet 
its financial obligations in full and on time (Standard & Poor’s, 2011). Jorion, Liu and Shi (2005) 
agree with this concept when they state that ratings express the opinion of the future ability, legal 
obligation, and willingness of a bond issuer or other obligor to make full and timely payments on 
principal and interest due to investors. According to Gray et al. (2006), a corporate credit rating is an 
independent evaluation of a firm’s ability to make debt payments in a timely fashion. In this context, 
credit rating can also be understood as a relative measure of credit risk, based on the analysis of 
quantitative and qualitative variables (Sales, 2006).  
According to Kim and Gu (2004) the bond rating is an indicator of a firm’s default risk. Choy, 
Gray and Ragunathan (2006) claim that studies on rating trends demonstrate that there is a clear 
correlation between credit ratings and the likelihood of subsequent default, that is, the higher the initial 
rating, the lower the probability of default and vice versa. 
Commonly, ratings are defined by symbols, and the same symbols are used for both corporate 
and bond ratings. Table 1 shows the rating categories used by Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s and 
Fitch. 
 
Table 1 
 
Ratings Definitions 
 
  S&P and Fitch/Moody’s  DESCRIPTION 
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
G
r
a
d
e
  AAA/Aaa  Extremely strong capacity to meet financial commitments. Highest rating. 
AA/Aa  Very strong capacity to meet financial commitments. 
A/A  Strong capacity to meet financial commitments, but somewhat susceptible to 
adverse economic conditions and changes in circumstances. 
BBB/Baa  Adequate capacity to meet financial commitments, but more subject to 
adverse economic conditions. 
S
p
e
c
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
G
r
a
d
e
 
BB/Ba  Less vulnerable in the near-term but faces major ongoing uncertainties to 
adverse business, financial and economic conditions. 
B/B  More vulnerable to adverse business, financial and economic conditions but 
currently has the capacity to meet financial commitments. 
CCC/Caa  Currently vulnerable and dependent on favorable business, financial and 
economic conditions to meet financial commitments. 
CC/Ca  Currently highly vulnerable. 
C/C  A bankruptcy petition has been filed or similar action taken, but payments of 
financial commitments are continued. 
D/-  Payments default on financial commitments. 
Note. Source: The descriptions presented in the Table 1 were collected from Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services. (2011). 
Guide  to  credit  rating  essentials:  what  are  credit  ratings  and  how  do  they  work?  Retrieved  from 
http://img.en25.com/Web/StandardandPoors/SP_CreditRatingsGuide.pdf;  however,  they  are  very  similar  to  the  ones The Determinants of Credit Rating   193 
BAR, Rio de Janeiro, v. 11, n. 2, art. 4, pp. 188-209, Apr./June 2014                  www.anpad.org.br/bar   
presented  by  Fitch  Ratings.  (n.d.).  Ratings  internacionais  de  crédito  de  longo  prazo.  Retrieved  from 
http://www.fitchratings.com.br/pages/rtg_intl_long and Moody’s Investors Service. (2013). Ratings symbols and definitions. 
Retrieved from https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_79004 
The agencies S&P and Fitch emphasize that ratings from AA to CCC may be modified by the 
addition of positive (+) and negative (-) signs to show the relative position within the rating categories. 
Moody’s (2013) notes that ratings can also be changed from the addition of numbers 1, 2 and 3 for 
each category from Aa through Caa, in order to show the relative position of each rating within the 
category. 
According to Camargo (2009), due to the sophistication of financial instruments, agencies have 
sought to improve their criteria and methodologies. Gray et al. (2006) argue that the rating standards 
used by agencies are increasing over time; in other words, as agencies are becoming more rigorous, a 
firm would need to improve its financial ratios over time just to maintain its credit rating. 
To  formulate  their  opinions  on  companies’  credit  risk,  rating  agencies  use  different 
methodologies.  Some  focus  only  on  quantitative  data,  which  are  incorporated  into  mathematical 
models.  Others  use  both  quantitative  and  qualitative  information  obtained  through  meetings  with 
company/government personnel (Standard & Poor’s, 2011). This second approach uses a set of criteria 
consisting of principles, methodologies and assumptions. According to Standard & Poor’s (2010), the 
principles are the fundamental elements for the analysis of credit risk and the treatment of quantitative 
and qualitative information; methodologies are specific methods that govern the application of the 
principles to a specific rating; and assumptions are projections, estimates and parameters used in the 
models. 
Is it important to mention that credit risk can also be measured using other methodologies. For 
instance, it can be measured by risk premium embedded in Yield-to Maturity (YTM) of corporate 
bonds, which is based on an equilibrium model instead of a credit rating based on a corporate decision. 
In approach, the yield-to-maturity (YTM) of a fixed-rate bond is defined as the constant internal rate 
of return that recovers the price. Using this concept, one can compute a spread measure by comparing 
the YTM of a risky bond to that of a hypothetical treasury bond, risk free, with the same maturity as 
the risky bond. This hypothetical bond is determined by interpolating with a reference curve that is 
constructed from benchmark Treasury securities. 
It is worth mentioning that the importance of corporate credit rating can be analyzed from the 
perspective of companies receiving the rating, investors, regulators or even taking into account the 
view of the market as a whole.  
From the company perspective, a credit rating has great practical importance since it impacts the 
firm’s cost of debt, its financing structure, and even its ability to continue trading (Gray, Mirkovic, & 
Ragunathan, 2006). The rationale here is that the cost of debt becomes more expensive as the rating 
deteriorates. For this reason, the rating also impacts managers’ decisions on new loans and financing. 
According to Kang and Liu (2007), also from the company view, monitoring exercised by rating 
agencies  may  supplement  payment  schemes  based  on  shares  and  other  corporate  governance 
mechanisms  to  discipline  CEOs.  This  constant  monitoring  exercised  by  rating  agencies  tends  to 
influence management to act in the interest of shareholders to maximize the value of the firm. In other 
words, credit rating does have a corporate governance function.  
In the view of investors, “ratings are the principal source of information about the “quality” and 
marketability of various bond issues” (Pinches & Singleton, 1978, p. 29), as rating agencies have 
access to confidential information that is not available to the market. This can potentially increase the 
value of credit ratings to the public (Jorion, Liu, & Shi, 2005). 
Credit rating literature suggests that they serve two purposes: to certify a company’s existing 
financial condition to investors (initial rating) and signal a change in a company’s prevailing financial 
condition (rating changes) (Poon & Chan, 2008). F. C. de S. Murcia, F. D. Murcia, S. Rover, J. A. Borba  194 
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Regulators, like investors, use credit ratings to save resources they would otherwise devote to 
credit  evaluation.  In  particular,  regulators  employ  a  variety  of  specific  ratings  as  thresholds  for 
determining capital charges and investment prohibitions on institutional portfolio holdings (Cantor & 
Packer, 1997). In fact, regulators recognize that the major financial market participants use such credit 
ratings as a reference for the calculation of their capital requirements for solvency purposes or for 
calculating risks in their investment activity (Papaikonomou, 2010). 
Finally, the credit rating agencies have an important role to play in supplementing the solvency 
monitoring  systems  of  insurance  industry  regulators,  as  well  as  enhancing  the  screening  and 
monitoring  activities  of  investment  analysts  and  providers  of  corporate  debt  (Adams,  Burton,  & 
Harwick, 2003). To the extent that they are specialists in obtaining and processing information about 
default risk, rating agency actions reduce lenders’ information-gathering costs and thereby facilitate 
securities markets operations (Creighton, Gower, & Anthony, 2007, pp. 1-2). Table 2 presents prior 
studies on determinants of credit rating. 
 
Table 2 
 
Reference Literature Regarding Determinants of Credit Rating 
 
AUTHORS  SAMPLE  SIGNIFICATIVE VARIABLES 
Bouzouita and 
Young (1998) 
US insurance companies that 
received a rating from the A.M. Best 
in 1989-1992. 
Profitability, Growth in surplus, Leverage, Line 
mix, Liquidity, Size, Organizational form 
Adams, Burton and 
Hardwick (2003) 
UK insurance companies that 
received a rating from the A.M. Best 
and S&P. 
Capital adequacy, Profitability, Liquidity, 
Growth, Size, Reinsurance, Organizational form, 
Business activity 
Bhojraj and 
Sengupta (2003) 
Industrial bond issues that received a 
rating from 1991-1996. 
Institutional ownership, Proportion of the board 
consisting of outsiders, Concentrated ownership, 
Debt/Equity, Profit margin, Total assets, Market 
value of common equity/Book of common equity 
Kim and Gu (2004)  25 casino and hotel firms that had 
ratings by Moody’s from 1996-2001. 
Debt service coverage, Profitability, Size 
Roje (2005)  Firms that have credit ratings in years 
1998-2002. 
Return on assets, Return on equity, Profit, Market 
value of equity, Tangible book value/Assets, 
Leverage, Long term debt/Total assets, Projected 
benefit obligation-pension plan assets/Total 
assets, Volatility of earnings 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, 
Collins and LaFond 
(2006) 
Firms with different corporate 
governance levels that received 
ratings by S&P. 
Number of outside blockholders, Quality 
accruals, Timeliness of firms’ earnings, 
Independence of board, CEO power, Percentage 
of shares held by officers or directors, Board 
expertise, Leverage, Return on assets, Net income 
before extraordinary items, Size, Subordinated 
debt, Interest coverage 
Gray, Mirkovic and 
Ragunathan (2006) 
Australian firms that received ratings 
by S&P from 1995 through 2002. 
Interest coverage, Leverage, Profitability, 
Industry concentration 
Sales (2006)  44 Brazilian banks.  Total assets, Equity, Deposits, Gross profit, Net 
profit, Operating profit 
Sih (2006)  Firms that operate in the USA.  Industry, Cash, Market value 
Bone (2007) 
Bone (2010) 
Only Petrobrás (2007). 
Only Repsol-YPF (2010). 
Interest coverage, Short-term debt/Total debt 
López (2007)  Financial firms that operate in Europe.  Reinsurance, Profitability 
Continues The Determinants of Credit Rating   195 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
AUTHORS  SAMPLE  SIGNIFICATIVE VARIABLES 
Damasceno, Artes 
and Minardi (2008) 
39 firms that operate in Brazil.  Ibovespa participation, Total gross debt + Other 
liabilities/Total assets, Return on assets 
Shiu and Chiang 
(2008) 
Firms that make up the Lloyd's 
Market. 
Leverage, Reinsurance, Concentration index, 
Profitability, Liquidity, Growth, Size 
Bone and Ribeiro 
(2009) 
16 non-financial Brazilian firms.  Total debt/EBITDA, Net cash flow/Total debt 
Matousek and 
Stewart (2009) 
681 international banks.  Equity/Total assets, Liquidity, Size, Net interest 
margin, Operating expense/Operating profit, 
Return on assets 
Finally, is worthwhile mentioning that credit agencies have been criticized due to their failure to 
accurately predict and warn investors about companies’ financial difficulties. For instance, some banks 
that filed for bankruptcy during the 2008 crisis had investment grade ratings. For Bone and Ribeiro 
(2009), the rating classification process lacks transparency, leading to the question of what are the 
relevant factors taken into consideration by the agencies.  
It is also argued that agencies do not have incentives to seek detailed information about debt 
issuers, given the high cost of new information. Thus, agencies tend to follow only the market risk, 
rather than company-specific risk. In this case, market participants argue that ratings are predictable, 
since  they  only  reproduce  the  sensitivity  found  in  the  market,  and  don’t  have  any  inherent 
informational content. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
 
Description of this study’s methodological aspects is divided into three parts. First, we describe 
the hypotheses, together with their theoretical justifications. Second, the model, statistical technique, 
variables and proxies are discussed. Finally, data collection steps and the study’s sample are presented.  
 
Hypotheses development 
 
To  identify  the  determinants  of  credit  ratings,  ten  hypotheses  were  formulated,  which  are 
presented below. 
 
Leverage 
 
H1: Less leveraged firms have better credit ratings. 
Firms finance their operations with liabilities and equity. In general, as you increase the level of 
debt in the capital structure of an entity, other variables held constant, the company becomes riskier. 
Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between credit ratings and debt level. 
According to Bouzouita and Young (1998), a high level of leverage increases the probability of 
default and the adverse variations in underwriting and/or economic conditions may, therefore, affect 
the rating. Shiu and Chiang (2008) add that a firm with high debt tends to have a high financial 
uncertainty and consequent high risk of insolvency. F. C. de S. Murcia, F. D. Murcia, S. Rover, J. A. Borba  196 
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Gray et al. (2006) argue that the greater the degree of financial leverage, the smaller the cushion 
the firm has with respect to any unanticipated changes to its fortunes. Thus, higher leverage is usually 
associated with lower credit ratings. 
 
Profitability 
 
H2: More profitable firms have better credit ratings. 
Generally, a profitable firm has a greater ability to generate cash to meet its financial obligations 
(Gray  et  al.,  2006).  In  this  context,  we  expect  a  positive  relationship  between  credit  rating  and 
profitability. 
According  to  Bouzouita  and  Young  (1998,  p.  26)  “profitability  reflects  the  ability  of 
management  to  maintain  strong  operation  and  adequate  pricing”.  In  this  sense,  companies  that 
experience a sustained increase in the level of their surplus are more likely to receive a better rating. 
Adams et al. (2003) point out that examination of profitability enables financial analysts and 
industry regulators to assess a firm’s ability to invest annual surpluses efficiently in order to generate 
new business. Furthermore, measures of profitability also provide insights into management’s ability 
to control expenses effectively and to set competitive rates of premium. 
 
Size 
 
H3: Larger firms have better credit ratings. 
As  observed  in  business  practice,  large  companies  have  easier  access  to  credit  and  are 
considered important for the economy of a country as a whole. Thus, they tend to receive aid from the 
government, as they are to big to fail.  
Moreover, Bouzouita and Young (1998, p. 27) argue that “large companies are better able to 
sustain unfavorable changes in economic conditions”. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) agree when they 
mention that large companies have high ratings because of their low market risks. Kim and Gu (2004) 
found a positive relationship between size and rating. According to these authors, this is due to their 
better ability to minimize the impact of economic, social, and political changes. 
 
Financial coverage 
 
H4: Firms with higher financial coverage have better credit ratings. 
The financial coverage indicators attempt to capture a company’s ability to generate cash flow 
to  pay  interest  expenses  (Bone,  2007).  Therefore,  we  expected  financial  cover  to  be  positively 
correlated to a credit rating. 
According to Gray et al. (2006) credit ratings tend to be highly sensitive to a firm’s interest 
coverage ratio; thus firms with higher coverage ratios are likely to have higher credit ratings. For 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond (2006) as a company’s operating cash flow declines, the default 
risk increases, leading to lower credit ratings. Thus, a low level of financial coverage may represent 
high risk. 
 
Growth 
 
H5: Firms with higher growth rates have better credit ratings. 
According to Adams et al. (2003) higher growth rates are associated with higher credit ratings 
because it indicates a strong future cash flow performance and higher economic value. In the same The Determinants of Credit Rating   197 
BAR, Rio de Janeiro, v. 11, n. 2, art. 4, pp. 188-209, Apr./June 2014                  www.anpad.org.br/bar   
view, Bouzouita and Young (1998, p. 26) claim that “firms who experience a sustained increase in the 
level of their surplus are more likely to receive a better rating”. 
 
Liquidity 
 
H6: Firms with greater liquidity have better credit ratings. 
“A high degree of liquidity enables the insurer to meet unexpected needs for cash without 
having to sell assets at a discounted value” (Bouzouita & Young, 1998, p. 27). In general, higher 
liquidity indicates that a firm has a better ability to cover short-term liabilities with current assets that 
can be transformed into money much faster than long-term assets (Roje, 2005). Empirical evidence 
shows that liquidity is an important factor in the corporate decision to obtain a credit rating (Adams et 
al., 2003). 
 
Corporate governance 
 
H7: Firms with better corporate governance have better credit ratings. 
According to Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) an effective corporate governance mechanism can 
affect bond yields and ratings through its impact on default risk. The rationale is that companies with 
good  governance practices would be seen as  the most reliable companies, with a higher level of 
disclosure and transparency.  
Also,  governance  mechanisms  tend  to  reduce  potential  conflicts  of  interests  between 
management and providers of capital through effective monitoring of their actions. This can reduce 
expropriation and misallocation of funds, improve the firm’s productivity and disclosures and provide 
management  with  a  long-term  planning  horizon.  All  these  could  be  perceived  positively  by 
bondholders, resulting in a reduction in the firms' perceived default risk, therefore improving credit 
rating.  
 
Control 
 
H8: State-controlled firms have better credit ratings than private firms. 
It can be argued that state-controlled enterprises are less likely to default as they tend to get help 
from  state in bad times. Moreover,  in  Brazil,  many  companies  that  provide basic  services  to  the 
population (electricity, water etc.) are controlled (i.e. majority of ordinary shares) by the government. 
As we know, these services are essential to the population, which makes default and or bankruptcy a 
‘political’ event, which tends to be avoided by politicians in power.  
Is it is worthwhile to mention that this hypotheses has not been tested in prior studies and 
therefore  the link  between  government  control  and credit  rating  is  not  quite clear in  the  existing 
literature.  
 
Performance in the financial market 
 
H9: Best performing firms in the financial market have better credit ratings. 
Rating agencies use both quantitative and qualitative variables to evaluate a company (Standard 
& Poor’s, 2010). However, they do not clearly disclose the variables they use; and even if they did, 
perhaps most of them, it would be difficult to measure. For instance, a change of CEO, a strategic 
repositioning or the presence of new outside directors could generate improvement in  companies’ 
financial conditions to honor their debts.  F. C. de S. Murcia, F. D. Murcia, S. Rover, J. A. Borba  198 
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Thus, good performance in financial markets could reflect improvements that would be difficult 
to  capture  by  other  measures.  According  to  the  Efficient  Market  Hypothesis  (EMH),  the  market 
absorbs information immediately, quickly reflecting any new relevant facts in stock prices. In this 
context, a company’s value is influenced by any new information that is relevant. 
In this sense, performance in financial markets could be related to corporate rating, because both 
are affected by new relevant information. Although the relationship might not be direct (rating-price-
rating) as already highlighted, several kinds of qualitative information taken into account by agencies, 
which are difficult to model, should also impact share price.   
For this reason, we’ve chosen to use a variable related to performance in financial markets in 
order to capture the effects of all new information that impact the stock price. It is worth mentioning 
that the inclusion of this variable is unprecedented in determinant rating studies and has not been 
tested previously by other authors. 
 
Internationalization 
 
H10: Firms that issues ADRs have better credit ratings. 
Several Brazilian companies have sought to diversify  their portfolio of investors by issuing 
American Depositary Receipts (ADR) and obtaining resources in the US market through the dual 
listing of shares. Camargos, Gomes and Barbosa (2003) argue that the lack of long-term funds in the 
Brazilian market has been the leading factor for the issuance of ADRs by Brazilian companies. Also, 
as known, companies aim to obtain international visibility and cheaper capital.  
According  to  Coffee  (1999),  firms  use  ADR  to  help  attract  more  capital  through  external 
financing. The author also claims that the supervision by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and U.S. sanction laws can protect minority shareholders, deterring potential fraud involving 
foreign companies listed on U.S. capital market, thus minimizing agency cost. 
It is worth mentioning that foreign companies that trade ADRs in levels II and III are also 
subject to the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act 2002, among which one can highlight: 
arrangement  of  an  audit  committee,  the  presence  of  a  financial  expert  on  the  board  of  directors, 
strengthening of controls, higher disclosure requirements, etc.  
In this sense, we expect the  impacts of lower cost of capital, international visibility, better 
governance practices and SEC supervision, all resulting from cross listing in the US, to be positively 
related to corporate rating.   
 
Statistical technique 
 
According to Gujarati (2006) a variable can be treated as ordinal when its values represent 
categories with some intrinsic ranking like a degree of satisfaction. Although degree of satisfaction is 
not a scale variable, one is able to order the different levels in a ranking: high level, medium level, etc. 
This is the same with credit ratings, which are presented in terms of categories (AAA, AA etc.) that 
can be seen as a result of a continuous variable capacity to honor debt obligations.  
The Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) was first introduced by Liang and Zeger (1986) as 
a method of estimation of regression model parameters when dealing with correlated data. Regression 
analyses with the GEE methodology  are commonly chosen when the outcome of the measure of 
interest is discrete, like a credit rating, rather than continuous. 
GEE  is  used  to  estimate  marginal  or  population-averaged  effect  dependence,  as  parameter 
estimates from GEE are consistent even when the covariance structure is misspecified, under mild 
regularity  conditions.  Dependence  among  the  responses  for  units  in  a  given  cluster  is  taken  into The Determinants of Credit Rating   199 
BAR, Rio de Janeiro, v. 11, n. 2, art. 4, pp. 188-209, Apr./June 2014                  www.anpad.org.br/bar   
account  but  treated  as  a  nuisance,  whereas  this  dependence  is  of  central  interest  in  multilevel 
modeling.  
In this sense, the GEE is appropriate for this study, as data was collected across successive 
points in time; thus, if this correlation is not taken into consideration, the model will not be valid. 
Camargo (2009) highlights that, to use the information in rating regressions, several authors 
have transformed ratings into numerical values. By doing so, one obtains an ordinal variable, a type of 
non-metric scaling, which may be ordered. Following this same line of thinking, Silva, Santos, Torres, 
and Ferreira (2009) mention that the conversion of credit ratings into numerical values allows the 
equivalence between the ratings issued by different credit rating agencies. They also emphasize that 
the numbers used only indicate the relative positions of an ordered series.  
Some  previous  studies  (Ashbaugh-Skaife,  Collins,  &  LaFond,  2006;  Damasceno,  Artes,  & 
Minardi, 2008; Silva, Santos, Torres, & Ferreira, 2009) have opted to split the ratings into seven 
groups, which we have also done in the present study.  
However, very few companies were assigned ratings of 1, 2 and 6. In this sense, for technical 
reasons related to parameter estimation, ratings classes were redefined by incorporating ratings 1 and 2 
into class 3 and rating 6 into class 5. In this sense, a three-level classification has been used in this 
paper, as shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
 
Dependent Variable Classes 
 
  S&P  MOODY’S  OLD CLASSES  NEW CLASSES 
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
G
r
a
d
e
 
AAA  Aaa 
7 
3 
AA+  Aa1 
AA  Aa2 
AA-  Aa3 
A+  A1 
6  A  A2 
A-  A3 
BBB+  Baa1 
5  BBB  Baa2 
BBB-  Baa3 
S
p
e
c
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
G
r
a
d
e
 
BB+  Ba1 
4  2  BB  Ba2 
BB-  Ba3 
B+  B1 
3 
1 
B  B2 
B-  B3 
CCC+  Caa1 
2  CCC  Caa2 
CCC-  Caa3 
CC  Ca 
1  C  C 
D/SD   
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Variables measured on an ordinal scale such as a rating do not exhibit a measure of actual 
magnitude  in  absolute  terms.  What  can  be  inferred  is  only  the  order  among  values,  but  not  the 
difference between them. Thus, an AAA, which receives a value of 16 on a numerical scale, cannot be 
regarded as twice as good as a BBB, whose value is eight on a numerical scale.  
Regarding ordinal data, the difference between the values 15 and 16 may not be assumed to be 
equal to the difference between the values of 8 and 9, for example. The most that can be said is that if 
the rating increases on a numerical scale, there is a monotonic relationship of growth in credit quality 
(Camargo, 2009).The dependent variable, the credit rating, is composed of 22 levels on Standard & 
Poor’s scale and 21 levels on Moody’s scale. 
With respect to the independent variables derived from the hypotheses, Table 4 summarizes 
their proxies and previous studies that have tested and confirmed their statistical significance. 
 
Table 4 
 
Hypotheses, Proxies and Reference Literature 
 
HYPOTHESES  PROXY  REFERENCE LITERATURE 
Leverage (-) 
LEV 
Current liabilities + Long-term 
liabilities / Total assets 
Adams, Burton and Hardwick (2003) 
Gray, Mirkovic and Ragunathan (2006) 
Damasceno, Artes and Minardi (2008) 
Shiu and Chiang (2008) 
Profitability (+) 
PROF 
Net profit / Equity  Bouzouita and Young (1998) 
Adams, Burton and Hardwick (2003) 
Kim and Gu (2004) 
Gray, Mirkovic and Ragunathan (2006) 
López (2007) 
Damasceno, Artes and Minardi (2008) 
Shiu and Chiang (2008) 
Matousek and Stewart (2009) 
Size (+) 
SIZE 
Natural logarithm of total assets  Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) 
Kim and Gu (2004) 
Sales (2006) 
Sih (2006) 
Shiu and Chiang (2008) 
Matousek and Stewart (2009) 
Financial coverage (+) 
COV 
EBIT/ Financial expense  Kim and Gu (2004) 
Gray, Mirkovic and Ragunathan (2006) 
Bone (2007) 
Growth (+) 
GRO 
Change in annual revenues  Bouzouita and Young (1998) 
Shiu and Chiang (2008) 
Liquidity (+) 
LIQ 
Current assets / Current 
liabilities 
Adams, Burton and Hardwick (2003) 
Shiu and Chiang (2008) 
Matousek and Stewart (2009) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
HYPOTHESES  PROXY  REFERENCE LITERATURE 
Corporate governance 
(+) 
CG 
Dummy variable: 1 for firms in the 
Level 2 and Novo Mercado; 0 for 
others  
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond 
(2006) 
Control (+) 
CONT 
Dummy variable: 1 for government 
control and 0 for private control 
Sales (2006)* 
Performance in the 
financial market (+) 
PERF 
Market to book = Stock Market value / 
Equity 
Variables that are unprecedented in rating 
studies and have not been tested previously 
by other authors 
Internationalization (+) 
INTER 
Dummy variable: 1 for firms that 
issues ADRs II and III levels; 0 for 
others 
Note. *Control was tested by Sales, B. F. (2006). Desenvolvimento de metodologia de rating baseado no modelo ordered 
probit (Dissertação de mestrado). Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil., but we´ve adopted another proxy.  
The following equation presents the panel model with ten independent variables: 
                                                                            
                                                      
where       is  a  non-observable  latent  variable  that  originates  the  credit  rating,  β  are  parameters, 
j=0,...,10 and     are normal random errors. 
As our data presented a panel structure, with 49 companies and 153 observations, we have 
conducted a panel data analysis to assure the validity of the statistical tests. We used the Generalized 
Estimating  Equations  (GEE)  model,  for  an  unbalanced  panel,  assuming  errors  have  a  poisson 
distribution. For all tests conducted, Wald Chi-Square was statistically significant, which shows the 
models’ adherence. We used the Stata 11® to conduct the statistical analysis. The correlation matrix 
for the study’s independent variables is presented in Table 5: 
 
Table 5 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 
   LEV  PROF  SIZE  COV  GRO  LIQ  CG  CONT  PERF  INTER 
LEV  1  .161
*  -.405
**  .038  -.033  -.189
*  .151  -.490
**  -.103  .011 
PROF 
 
1  .050  .028  -.071  .004  -.007  -.051  -.521
**  -.053 
SIZE 
   
1  .025  -.087  -.049  -.271
**  .508
**  -.072  .325
** 
COV 
     
1  .050  .122  .027  -.177
*  .056  .109 
GRO 
       
1  -.053  .051  -.151  .071  -.008 
LIQ 
         
1  .325
**  -.147  .164
*  -.006 
CG 
           
1  -.179
*  .060  .001 
CONT 
             
1  -.119  .046 
PERF 
               
1  .177
* 
INTER                             1 
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It is worthwhile to mention that no correlation between the independent variables was higher 
than 70%, so it was not necessary to previously exclude any variables in the previously presented 
model. The highest correlation found was between the variables profitability and performance, with 
a negative correlation of 52.1%. 
 
Data and sample 
 
To identify the determinants of credit ratings we used Brazilian companies’ current and past 
ratings,  as  well  as  accounting,  financial  and  market  information  available  in  the  Economática® 
database.  Data  regarding  presence  in  Levels  of  Corporate  Governance  were  collected  from  the 
BM&FBovespa site (the São Paulo Stock Market). Data about the issuance of ADRs were found on 
the Brazilian Securities Commission website (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários [CVM]). 
We used all credit ratings issued by Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s for companies operating in 
Brazil, which were available at these rating agencies’ databases.  
Just like other prior studies (Damasceno et al., 2008; Kang & Liu, 2007; Roje, 2005), our paper 
utilizes ratings of long-term domestic bonds, and does not include financial firms in the final sample, 
due to differences in accounting standards and interpretation of various ratios (Gray et al., 2006). 
Table 6 presents the observations contained in Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s databases and 
exclusions made due to different issues in order to arrive at this study’s final sample. 
 
Table 6 
 
Information about the Study’s Sample 
 
EXCLUSIONS  S&P  Moody's  TOTAL 
Total observation base  481  147  628 
(-) Observations of non-public firms  215  63  278 
(-) Observations of financial firms  61  04  65 
(-) Observations of public bonds  20  10  30 
(-) Observations with missing data  34  16  50 
(-) Duplicates observations  35  17  52 
(=) Total observations analyzed  116  37  153 
It is worthwhile to mention that in the cases where more than one rating was assigned for the 
company during the year, either by the same rating agency or not, only the first rating issued has been 
considered. For example, if the company received one rating in January and another in November, 
only the January rating was considered in our model.   
The two databases together (S&P and Moody’s) had a total of 628 observations and this study’s 
final sample consisted of a total of 153 observations, derived from 49 companies during the period 
1997-2011.  
 
 
Results 
 
 
As already mentioned, in order to identify the determinants of credit rating in Brazil, we used a 
Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) with a panel structure, with credit rating (RATING) as the 
dependent variable and ten independent variables, namely: leverage (LEV), profitability (PROF), size The Determinants of Credit Rating   203 
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(SIZE),  financial  coverage  (COV),  growth  (GRO),  liquidity  (LIQ),  corporate  governance  (CG), 
control (CONT), financial market performance (PERF), and internationalization (INTER). 
Table 7 provides a descriptive analysis of the quantitative dependent variables. 
 
Table 7 
 
Descriptive Analysis of Independent Quantitative Variables 
 
Variables  N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
LEV  153  0.30  1.09  0.63  0.16 
PROF  153  -2.24  11.00  0.16  0.97 
SIZE  153  13.25  19.49  16.01  1.28 
COV  153  -178.48  21.13  0.18  15.18 
GRO  153  -0.60  2.90  0.24  0.39 
LIQ  153  0.22  4.88  1.21  0.70 
PERF  153  -28.86  25.61  1.80  4.31 
As presented in Table 7, we calculated the minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation 
for all seven independent variables. Corporate governance, control and internationalization were 
not analyzed quantitatively as they are binary variables. Regarding these three variables, the following 
was observed: 22.9% of the sample was listed in Level 2 and in the New Market of BM&FBovespa; 
22.2% were companies controlled by the State and 39.9% were companies cross-listed in the United 
Statesd with ADRs in levels II and III.  
Table 8 presents a descriptive analysis of the dependent variable: rating.   
 
Table 8 
 
Frequency Distribution of the Dependent Variable 
 
Rating  N  Percentage 
1  43  28.1% 
2  72  47.1% 
3  38  24.8% 
Total  153  100% 
The majority of ratings found in the sample are those belonging to groups BB of Standard & 
Poor’s (BB +, BB and BB-) and Ba by Moody’s (Ba1, Ba2 and Ba3), which were converted into level 
4, as described earlier. Furthermore, one might note that 71.9% of ratings are in the Speculative Grade 
category, while the other 28.1% were in the Investment grade category. 
There are no ratings at level 7 in the sample, those belonging to group AA (AA +, AA and AA-) 
and AAA – in the classification adopted by Standard & Poor’s – and their equivalents in group Aa 
(Aa1, Aa2 and Aa3) and Aaa – Moody’s ratings. 
Finally, out of the three ratings at level 1, two were issued to the Metropolitana Eletricidade de 
São Paulo (ELETROPAULO) in 2002 and 2003, and the other was issued to the Net Serviços de 
Comunicação  also  in  2003.  The  ratings  at  level  6  were  issued  to  Petrobras  in  2004  and  to  the 
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Table 9 displays the significance of the initial model. 
 
Table 9 
 
Significance of the Initial Panel Model 
 
GEE population-averaged  model 
Group variable:  company 
Number of obs  153 
Number of groups  49 
Wald chi2(10)  87.70 
Prob > chi2  0.0000 
The initial model consists of all ten variables and was significant at the 1% level.  
Table 10 presents the results of the initial panel model, with the respective significance for each 
variable and coefficient. 
 
Table 10 
 
Results of the Initial Panel Model 
 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>z 
LEV  -.9181874  .1946228  -4.72  0.000 
PROF  .0676682  .0453362  1.49  0.136 
SIZE  .0373189  .033267  1.12  0.262 
COV  -.0009486  .0005064  -1.87  0.061 
GRO  -.0682239  .0463388  -1.47  0.141 
LIQ  .0443729  .0378304  1.17  0.241 
CG  -.0306068  .0683893  -0.45  0.654 
CONT  -.0912558  .123126  -0.74  0.459 
PERF  .0216867  .0121431  1.79  0.074 
INTER  .1339771  .0650917  2.06  0.040 
_CONS  .5488962  .5530447  0.99  0.321 
In the initial panel model, the variable leverage (LEV) was statistically significant at the 1% 
level  and  internationalization  (INTER)  was  significant  at  the  5%  level.  The  variables  financial 
coverage (COV) and financial market performance (PERF) were significant at the 10% level. 
Following, we’ve excluded all the non-significant variables, one at the time, and tested the 
model again as follows: first we excluded corporate governance (CG), with a significance level of 
0.654 and tested all variables again; then we removed the variable control (CONT), with significance 
of 0.471; next, size (SIZE) with a significance of 0.293 and liquidity (LIQ) with a significance of 
0.295; and finally financial coverage (COV) with 0.128.  
Table 11 shows the significance level of the final panel model. 
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Table 11 
 
Significance of the Final Panel Model 
 
GEE population-averaged  model 
Group variable:  company 
Number of obs  153 
Number of groups  49 
Wald chi2(5)  57.03 
Prob > chi2  0.0000 
The final panel model was significant at the 1% level. Table 12 presents the results of the final 
panel model, with the significance for each variable and respective coefficient. 
 
Table 12 
 
Results of Final Panel Model 
 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>z 
LEV  -.9602618  .1839527  -5.22  0.000 
PROF  .0745925  .0452558  1.65  0.099 
GRO  -.0803098  .0470839  -1.71  0.088 
PERF  .0229738  .0111409  2.06  0.039 
INTER  .1609862  .0573787  2.81  0.005 
_CONS  1.18955  .1085322  10.96  0.000 
In the final panel model, the variables leverage (LEV), and internationalization (INTER) were 
statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level;  financial  market  performance  (PERF)  was  statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The variables profitability (PROF) and growth (GRO) were also relevant, 
but at the 10% level. 
One  might  note  that  the  two  new  variables  proposed  by  this  study  –  performance  and 
internationalization – were found to be relevant factors in explaining credit rating of companies 
operating in Brazil. 
Regarding the expected signals, the variable growth presented a sign contrary to what was 
expected, as our hypothesis was that firms with higher growth rates would present better credit ratings. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
This study aimed to identify the determinants of credit ratings in Brazil. To this end, we built a 
Generalized  Estimating  Equations  (GEE)  model  using  a  panel  structure  with  credit  rating  as  the 
dependent variable and ten other independent variables, namely: leverage, profitability, size, financial 
coverage,  growth,  liquidity,  corporate  governance,  control,  financial  market  performance,  and 
internationalization.  The  sample  comprised  a  total  of  153  credit  rating  observations  issued  to 
companies operating in Brazil during the period 1997-2011 by two major global agencies: Standard & 
Poor’s and Moody’s. F. C. de S. Murcia, F. D. Murcia, S. Rover, J. A. Borba  206 
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The  empirical  results  showed  that  five  variables  are  statistically  significant:  leverage, 
profitability, growth, financial market performance, and internationalization. 
The  two  variables  introduced  by  this  study  proved  to  be  significant:  financial  market 
performance, measured by the ratio of market value of shares and equity, was significant at a 5% 
level and internationalization, a dummy variable indicating whether the company had issued ADRs 
of levels II or III, was significant at a 1% level. As an indication for future work, we suggest the 
analysis of the determinant factors of credit rating in other countries, as the great majority of previous 
studies regarding the determinants of credit rating have been conducted in the USA, UK and Australia, 
so the effect in other markets is still unclear, especially in emerging economies. 
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